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EUROPEAN UNION
THE NEW TRANS ATLANTIC CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ^
AN EVALUATION OF LINER CONFERENCES UNDER THREAT
Jason Chuah
Times have been challenging for liner conferences.Developments in the EU and the US competition
law are very gradually but surely diminishing the effect of any antitrust immunity or exemptions1that
liner conferences have hitherto enjoyed, especially parties to theTrans Atlantic Conference Agree-
ment.2
On1May1999, theUSOceanShippingReformAct1998 came into effectmakingextensive changes to
the antitrust legal framework as applicable to liner shipping operating to and from America. It is
already having a fundamental impact on liner conferences and how carriers and cargo interests do
business with each other. Research carried out by the US Federal Maritime Commission in Sept-
ember 2001, two years after the reforms came into effect, revealed that in the first two years after
passage of OSRA, the proportion of cargo moving under service contracts increased precipitously
and the migration of cargo from conference-controlled service contracts to individual service
contracts was enormous.3 For example, the number of conference service contracts entered into
byTACA declined from 596 to 3.
Under the old regime, immunity from antitrust law is given to shipping conferences.That immunity,
although preserved in the new law, has to some extent been constrained.Under the 1984 Shipping
Act prior to the changes, for example, required prices had to be transparent and publicly disclosed.
The legislation required that service contracts entered into between carrier and shipper/s be filed
with the FederalMaritimeCommission (FMC) and the essential terms of the service contractswould
then be published andmade available to the public, including the price.The new law does away with
the requirement to disclose the price.Under section 8(c) of the amended Shipping Act1984, an in-
dividual ocean common carrier or an agreement between ocean common carriers may enter into
service contracts with one or more shippers and each contract is to be filed confidentially with the
FMC but a concise statement of the essential terms4 must be published and made available to the
1 Abrief description of the exemption systemunder EU law: ^ under Article 81(3) an anti-competitive agreementor arrangementmay
be exempted from the proscription against anti-competitiveness if it is one which contributes `^ to improving the production or dis-
tribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objec-
tives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question'.
Such an exemption is known as an i`ndividual exemption'.`Block exemption' is the termusedwhere there exists an EURegulation allow-
ing certain groups of anti-competitive agreements to be exempt from the proscription in Article 81(1) against anti-competitive ar-
rangements. In the context of maritime transport services, the relevant Regulation is Regulation 4056/86. It should however be
added that that Regulation is currently under review by the EU. See Commission `Consultation Paper on the Review of Council Regula-
tion 4056/86 Laying down Detailed Rules for the Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC to MaritimeTransport, (http:// europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/en.pdf ).
2 Members of theTACA are: Atlantic Container Line AB, Hapag-Lloyd Container Line GmbH,Mediterranean Shipping Company SA,
A.P.MÖller-Maersk Sealand,NipponYusen Kaisha,Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd and P&ONedlloyd Ltd.
3 See Creel (Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission), Statement submitted to Committee of the Judiciary, US House of
Representatives (5 June 2002).
4 Essential terms include the commodity, volume, duration and origin and destination port ranges.
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public in a tariff format. The rate, however, is expressly excluded ^ it is not an essential term for
publication.The intentionwas that the abilityof theparties to keep therate confidentialwould foster
greater competition resulting in better efficiency.5 Where pricing was public, conferences had enor-
mous power when it came to setting prices as there was no advantage in negotiating separate
contracts with shippers.Group contracts are losing their appeal because shippers can now cut deals
with individual carriers.6 Indeed, as a matter of economics, it would be more sound for carriers to
move from focusing on price setting to managing supply.
As far as theTrans Atlantic Conference is concerned, the impact of the US deregulatory Act was
made even more intense with the refusal of the Commission to grant them block exemption in1998
for arrangements under the Conference Agreement to provide for inland price fixing in the EU,
collective fixing of brokerage and freight forwarder remuneration and the fixing of terms on which
conference members might enter into service contracts with shippers.7 The Commission also
concluded that the members of theTACA had abused their collective dominant position, contrary
to Article 86 EC,8 by changing the competitive structure of the market and placing restrictions on
the availability and contents of service contracts.Fines in aggregate amount of ECU273 millionwere
imposed.That Decision by the Commission is being appealed against by the Conference.9
At around the same time theUS lawwasbeingbrought into force, theTACAmembers notified a new
agreement (`the revised TACA' or `the Agreement') to the Commission for block and individual
exemptions from EU competition law provisions.10 The Agreement applies generally to transatlantic
routes11and covers six principal areas:
(a) tariff rates
(b) service contracts
(c) through inter-modal freight rates12
(d) technical agreements
(e) operation of scheduled shipping services
(f ) regulation of carrying capacity offered bymembers
(g) consultation and administration of the agreement.
As is readily observed, the Agreementdeals with awide range of issues, some falling withinmaritime
transport services rules and others withinmore general competition law provisions.The Agreement
is interesting in two respects ^ first, it demonstrates that there is life yet for conferences and,
secondly, it seeks to prove that some conference arrangements not only fall within existing
exceptions to antitrust in EU law but also deserve to be exempt.
5 SeegenerallyMerck,Paper on L`ife afterOSRA',Containerisation International. 3rdAnnual Conference (22^23March 2000,London).
6 In the first year the new law came into effect, of the approximately 700 contracts signed byTACA member carriers, 530 were
confidential individual contracts and only 30 wereTACA service agreements (the others were made with multi-carrier non-TACA
contracts). Source:TACA.
7 Commission Decision1999/243/EC ^ Case No IV/35.134 (OJ L95 9 April1999, p.1).
8 Now Article 82, EC following theTreaty of Amsterdam.
9 JoinedCasesT-191/98,T-212/98,T-213/98 and T-214/98 Atlantic Container LineandOrsvCommission (Courtof First Instance, judgment
pending).
10 Commission Decision of14 November 2002 (OJ L26/53, 31 January 2003) ^ Case COMP/37.396/D2 ^ Revised TACA notified under
document number C(2002) 4349. It should be noted that with recent changes to EU competition law procedures, the notification
system has nowbeen abolished.The new legal exemption schememeans that therewill be automatic exemption for agreements meet-
ing the criteria in Article 81(3).The block exemption system remains unchanged.
11 It covers e`astbound and westbound shipping routes between (i) ports in the 48 contiguous States of the USA, and interior and
coastal points in the USA via the said ports and (ii) ports in Europe situated in latitudes from Bayonne, France to the North Cape,
Norway (excluding non-Baltic ports in Russia, Mediterranean ports and ports in Spain and Portugal) and, except for inland transport
services within the EEA, points in Europe via said non-excluded European ports, other than points in Spain or Portugal'.
12 This is a provision which impacts on inland transport removing itself from the block exemption for maritime transport services
(Regulation 4056/86). Under the newTACA, the parties are not authorised to discuss or agree prices with each other for inland
transport services suppliedwholly or partly within the EEA to shippers in combination of other services on offer.
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Service contracts13
Under the 1998 application, the original agreement was found to be void and unenforceable under
Article 8514 because the agreementmade itmore difficult forTACAmembers to enter into individual
service contracts ( I`SCs') with shippers, or prevented them from doing so, and restricted the terms
which couldbe included in an individual service contracts.The objectwas to preserve the cartel nature
of the conference.However, as is obvious under US law such restrictions would be unlawful under the
OSRA and following theCommissionDecision that itdidnot fallwithin theblockexemption contained
in Article 3, Regulation 4056/86 and that it did not qualify for individual exemption under Article
81(3), the fight to resist individual service contracts (and confidential pricing) seems entirely lost.
The revised Agreement seems to accept the newreality: it takes onboard the legal requirement that
no restrictions may be placed on the availability of individual service contracts. The new carrier
agreement provides that parties are authorised to negotiate and enter into service contracts15 with
any one or more shippers (conference service contracts or a`greement service contracts' ( A`SCs'))
relating to services provided between ports within the EEA and ports and inland points outside the
EEA. As regardsmulti-carrier service contracts, two ormorebutnot all TACAmembersmay freely
negotiate and enter intomulti-carrier service contracts (MSCs) with any shipper relating to services
provided between ports within the EEA and ports and inland points outside the EEA. Both
categories of contracts may include a price for all services closely related to the activity of maritime
transport, provided between the vessel and the port gate. Such contracts (ASCs and MSCs) are to
include certain essential terms including, inter alia, the minimum volume or portion, the line-haul
rate, the duration, service commitments and the liquidated damages payable in the event of non-
performance.There are also to be no restrictions on the parties toTACA to negotiate and enter into
ISCs with any shipper on any terms.Confidentiality of pricing is to bemaintained, in compliancewith
theOSRA1998.ThenewAgreement states expressly that the terms are toremainconfidentialunless
the shipper has consented to their disclosure. In the event where a shipper requests an ASC, any
member of the newTACAwho is a party to an ISC and/or MSCwith that shipper may disclose the
existence, but not the terms, of such a contract.
A significant provision in the newAgreement is that ASCs andMSCsmust not include carriers other
than the parties to theTACA and must not contain rate structures differentiated on the basis of
which carrier party transports the cargo. This element of imposed co-operation is an important
pillar to the new Agreement.
13 Most liner companies build their pricing policy around the dual principles of price stability (that is to say, demand and supply) and
price discrimination (see Stopford,Maritime Economics (Routledge, London,1997, p. 359). Service contracts or agreements are central
to the policy of price discrimination. Large customers with whom it is worth negotiating, can be offered special discounts and other
benefits (i.e. a service contract) while smaller customers continue to pay the regular tariff. However, without the ability to make
confidential individual service contracts formembers of, say, theTACA, any service contract involvingmembers of TACAwould clearly
not be customised, only standardised.
14 Now Article 81 ^ Paragraph (1) of the Article reads `The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the commonmarket: all
agreements betweenundertakings, decisions by associations or undertakings and concertedpracticeswhichmay affect tradebetween
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market, and in particular thosewhich:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) sharemarkets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactionswith other tradingparties therebyplacing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptanceby the other parties of supplementary obligationswhich, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connectionwith the subject of such contracts.'
15 It should be noted that the term s`ervice contract' as adopted in theTACA Agreement bears the same meaning as that set out in
section 3(19) of the OSRA1998.Under that Act, s`ervice contract' means a written contract, other than a bill of lading or a receipt,
between one ormore shippers and an individual ocean common carrier or an agreementbetween or among ocean common carriers in
which the shipper or shippers makes a commitment to provide a certain volume or portion of cargo over a fixed time period, and the
ocean common carrier or the agreement commits to a certain rate or rate schedule and a defined service level, such as assured space,
transit time, portrotation, or similar service features.The contractmay also specify provisions in the eventof non-performance on the
part of any party.
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The Commission's role was to assess whether theTACAwas first, in breach of competition law and
secondly, whether it qualified for individual exemption under Article 81(3) and/or exemption under
Regulation 4056/86.
Shipper groups have argued that the fact the lines are free to enter into ASCs and MSCs could very
well result in the restricting of the lines' freedom to negotiate and enter into ISCs. Although this
contention has some validity in economics theory, the current state of affairs does not reflect the
likelihood of such an outcome.Themajority of cargo is carried on ISCs, not ASCs and/or MSCs.The
position of the individual service contract as the preferred form of agreement between carrier and
shipper, in practice, would therefore not be challenged.
Another contentious issue was the provision in the newTACA that the parties to theTACA may
adopt a standard but non-binding ASC form.Those engaged in ISC and MSC activities may refer to
and adopt the standard ASC form and refer to and adopt published ASC rates and/or tariff terms.
Although theConference submitted that this provisionwould enableparties to customise any service
contract, shipper groups are not entirely convinced that lines negotiating ISCs would not use the
standard form almost as a template, thereby leading to a concertedpracticewhich is anti-competitive.
TheCommission also found that thatprovision is nomore than a statementof what inpracticewould
be an obvious starting point for many such negotiations and if an ISC entered into in reliance on the
standard ASCreveals evidence of anti-competitive concertedpractice, such behaviour would clearly
not be covered by the exemption. A distinction is made by the Commission between a non anti-
competitive agreement (the provision to use the ASP standard form) and the use of a non anti-
competitive agreement to practise anti-competitive acts (using that provision to enter into some
concerted practice in breach of Article 81(1)).The fact that the parties agree to consider using the
ASP standard formwhen negotiating ISCs per se is not indicative of a concerted practice.The use of
such standards is consistentwith the new strategyof the conference to adopt similar b`enchmarks' to
retain some form of control over the businessmodusoperandi of conferencemembers. Implicit in this
new strategy is the role of information sharingbetween theparties.16 There is some concern that the
exchange of informationmight lead to the parties'discussing the terms and conditions of ISCs. As far
as the Commission is concerned, the newTACA does not remove the confidential nature of ISCs (or
MSCs) despite the agreement to share information because neither theTACA secretariat nor the
parties will have access to carrier-specific information relating to cargoes transported under ISCs
and MSCs. The parties will exchange information only on a general conference-wide basis ^ the
information is not contract or carrier specific; only general information is exchanged.
As towhether therevisedTACAqualified for exemptionunderArticle 317 ofRegulation 4056/86, the
Commission decided that the block exemption in Regulation 4056/86 covered only provisions of a
conference agreement which relate to the operation of and the fixing of a tariff for scheduled
maritime transport services. The Regulation does not however extend to provisions relating to
agreement service contracts and to multicarrier service contracts. This coincides with the strict
approach laid down by the Court of First Instance in theTAADecision18 which stated that the block
exemption provided for by Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86 should not be interpreted b`roadly and
progressively'19 so as to cover all the agreements which shipping companies deem it useful or even
necessary to adopt in order to function efficiently under existing market conditions. However, the
Commission considered that they did qualify for individual exemption ^ that is to say, although these
16 This is generally called r`ationalisation'.
17 Article 3 provides for exemption from the prohibition under Article 81(1), EC to members of a liner conference in respect of the
fixing of uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect of the fixing of uniform and common freight
rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provision of scheduled maritime transport services. Exemption is also
granted to a limited number of other activities if one or more of them is carried on by members of a liner conference in addition to
fixing prices and conditions of carriage.
18 CaseT-395/94 Atlantic Container Line and Ors v Commission [2002] ECR II-875; see also Commission Decision 94/980/EC; Case No
IV/34.446 ^ Trans-Atlantic Agreement OJ L376 (31December1994, p.1).
19 ibid., at para.146.
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provisions relating to service contracts were anti-competitive, they met the criteria for exemption
under Article 81(3).The reasons givenwere:
(a) the provision that lines may enter into ASCs or MSCs, and adopt a standard form of ASC of-
fered three specific benefits which the exception in Article 81(3) would recognise ^ first, the
provision of special services which improve the supply chain; secondly, the contribution they
would make to price stability; and thirdly, service contracts can reduce search costs and
administrative costs;
(b) given the fact that ISCs are no longer restricted, it would be sufficient that there are at least
some cases where joint service contracts could offer distinct benefits for shippers.The setting
of a joint contract price is an essential and non-severable element of a joint service contract and
is hence indispensable to the achievement of those benefits.
TheDecision on thesematters was generally well received, not only by EUpolicymakers but also by
shippers.20 The revised TACA had clearly taken cognisance of the displeasure of the EU as regards
the conference system.The question is: how will such drastic, albeit inevitable, changes affect the
way conferences have operated until now? Towhat extent do thesemeasures ensure that the liner
conference system remains a credible force in maritime transport economics? This issue is par-
ticularly significant in recent times not least in the light of continued s`tate aid' to national shipping
lines by some countries. For example, in the context of the transpacific market, following the
passing of a new law international maritime transportation by the Chinese Ministry of Com-
munications, concerns have arisen as to whether the law may create or perpetuate differing
requirements for, and treatment of, Chinese and non-Chinese carriers and intermediaries, or
creates or perpetuates unreasonable barriers to those who provide transportation services to
and from China.The emergence of large Chinese state-owned carriers, China Shipping Container
Lines,21 COSCO and Sinotrans, has clearly also added to the concerns of liner conferences.
Although efforts to seek clarification as to full impact of the new law are being undertaken, the
future seems quite uncertain.
Voluntary service agreement guidelines
Another aspect under consideration by the newTACA is voluntary service agreement guidelines.
These are guidelineswhich theparties to anAgreementwouldpromise to consider when negotiating
service contracts but they are not obliged to adhere to them.The fact that they are voluntarymeans
that they cannot be legally enforced. However, as Antony Merck, a US Federal Maritime
Commissioner, commented:
.` . . voluntary guidelines may pass the word test if sprinkled liberally throughout with the term
`` voluntary'' but themore significantmeasure, the economic test,where the inquiry is anti-competitive
brought about by lock step adherence to voluntary guidelines is more likely to be where the battle is
fought.'22
The question is whether such a high level of co-operation would run foul of antitrust law is par-
ticularlypertinent as some existing conferences are consideringrelyingonvoluntary service contract
guidelines to bind their members closer.Under Regulation 4056/86 exemptionwould be granted for
voluntary agreements in technical matters. Article 2(1) allows liner conferences voluntarily to co-
operate bymeans of:
(a) the introduction or uniform application of standards or types in respect of vessels and other
means of transport, equipment, supplies or fixed installations;
20 See European Shippers Council press release of15 November 2002 at www.europeanshippers.commission.
21 China ShippingContainer Lines entered theUSmarket in1999with only six vessels but, with thebackingof theChinese government,
has now emerged as one of the top tenTranspacific carriers.
22 Note 4 above.
INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALORGANISATIONS :EUROPEANUNION :JIML 9 [2003] 3 293
(b) the exchange or pooling, for the purpose of operating transport services, of vessels, space in
vessels or slots and othermeans of transport, staff, equipment or fixed installations;23
(c) the organisation and execution of successive or supplementary maritime transport operations
and the establishment or application of inclusive rates and conditions for such operations;
(d) the co-ordination of transport timetables for connecting routes;
(e) the consolidation of individual consignments, and;
(f ) the establishment or application of uniform rules concerning the structure and the condition
governing the application of transport tariffs.
Asmay be readily seen, the exemption in Regulation 4056/86 is principally applicable only to co-op-
eration in technical matters. Co-operation in commercial matters could well result in a breach of
Article 81EC. Itmight be noted that this distinction is not always convenientlymade.Much depends
on the net effect of the guidelines. If the result is that the member concerned having adhered to the
voluntary guidelines would in effect be inhibited frommaking service contracts or setting prices or
making an individual decision on commercialmatters, thoseguidelineswouldprobablybe inbreach of
competition law. For example, where the voluntary guidelines discourage members from entering
into service contracts by stating that they will not actively seek service contracts and if a shipper
asks for a service contract, the carrier will endeavour to bring the shipper to the discussion
agreement office, it seems quite clear that such guidelines would be in breach. However, as regards
the newTACAwhich expressly states that the parties may not a`dopt any form of guidelines for
individual service contracts, save purely technical, non-commercial, guidelines', the Commissionwas
convinced that there was no material likelihood of anti-competitive effects. Additionally, if the
voluntary service contract guidelines are subsequently abused by the conference, any exemption
givenwould be promptly revoked.
Most voluntary service contract guidelines tend to be generated from d`iscussion agreements'.These
are agreements where carriers commit themselves to co-operate as regards the carriers' approach
to service contracts and other related matters, where appropriate. They agree to refer to certain
guidelines, normally on technical and other non-commercial matters but there is no compulsion to
apply those guidelines.
Discussion agreements are different fromconferences in that theydo not set fixedcommonprices for
the many different individually defined commodities. They also do not negotiate contracts or
intervene in relations between carriers.They have the advantage of being able to help carriers carry
out trade-wide economic analyses so as better to manage the supply of shipping space. Additionally,
they constitute a forum for carriers to co-ordinate the process of implementing rate increases or
curbing sharp declines inrates.24 The attractiveness of discussion agreements in the current climate25
is that they do not interfere with the individual carrier's right to negotiate with shippers, and they
afford carriersmore flexibility to customise the rates and services tomeet the needs of specific ship-
pers. It is notbeyond thereasonable to anticipate that conferences asweunderstand themcouldwell
develop along the lines of the discussion agreement.
Cargo-handling services in a port
Under the newTACA, parties will no longer agree prices for inland transport in the EEA. The
Agreement provides that the parties a`re not authorised to discuss or agree prices with each other
for inland transport services supplied wholly or partly within the EEA to shippers in combination
with other services as part of a multimodal transport operation for the carriage of containerised
23 As far as the newTACA is concerned, co-operation has only been agreed in respect of para. (b).
24 Provided, of course, that it does not become anti-competitive or abusive of any dominance in the market. See Creel, Statement
before the Committee of the Judiciary,USHouse of Representatives (22 March 2000).
25 See Division of Transport of the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, F`inal Report on Competition Policy in Liner Shipping' (`OECDReport'), 16 April 2002.
294 JIML 9 [2003] 3 : EUROPEANUNION : INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALORGANISATIONS
cargo in the trade or any tariff or other matter pertaining to inland transport within the EEA'.26 It
however enables parties to fix charges applicable to cargo handling services in ports.
It is clear from the Court of First Instance's jurisprudence that Regulation 4056/86 will not apply to
agreementsrelating tomatters on inland transport services; that Regulation applies only tomaritime
transport services and the court has defined maritime transport as transport by sea from port to
port and thatmaritime transport service ends on arrival at the gateway port.The questionwas thus
whether theprovisionmightbe exemptunder Article 81(3).27 On this, the Commission decided that
those parts of the revised TACA tariff which covered cargo handling services are not repugnant to
EU competition law.The Commission stated that the cargo handling services in question provided in
ports are economically and physically closely connected to the maritime transport as such. The
evidencewas that ever since the advent of containerisation, these services have been contracted for
by carriers and invoiced directly to the latter by the cargo handler.28 Preserving the role of the
carriers in contracting with the cargo handler should be beneficial for the small cargo interest.The
presumption is that small cargo interests or shipperswouldnotnormally have the optimalbargaining
strength to negotiate individually with cargo handlers. The carrier (or conference) would be far
better placed to secure good rates from the cargo handlers and should necessarily be able to pass
on this saving to the cargo interest.
The Commission's approach here is one based primarily on arguments of economic efficiency and
consumer interests.The question one might raise, however, is to what extent could and should the
Commission consider factors notrelated to economic efficiency. In theCommission'sWhite Paper on
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty,29 the application of
Article 81(3) is broad. It admits policies other than economic efficiency to be taken into account
when deciding whether to allow agreements that are restrictive of competition. Policies on the
environment, energy, industry, employment, the regions etc. have all been relied on, in the past, by
the Commission in assessing whether the agreement is justifiable under Article 81(3). It seems clear
that the Commission could look beyond economic efficiency issues in deciding whether or not to
grant exemption under Article 81(3).
Thisbroader approach as a general principle however hasbeen criticised for failing to laydown a clear
guidance for national competition authorities and national courts when dealing with cases within
their jurisdiction.Whish states:
I`t is clear . . . that a number of factors have been influential in decisions under Article 81(3), not all of
which canbe considered to be``narrow'' improvements in efficiency.There are significantproponents of
the view that Article 81(3) does admit broad, non-competition considerations.This discussion suggests
that there is uncertainty ^ even confusion ^ as to the proper application of Article 81(3). . . . These
institutions [national competition authorities and national courts] must know the limits of their
discretion under Article 81(3); furthermore, they seem ill-placed to balance the restriction of com-
petition that an agreementmight entail against a broad range of Community policies; they would have
less difficulty, however, in applying a``narrow'' interpretation of Article 81(3), limited to a consideration
of economic efficiencies.'30
The question is clearly an important one given the recently proposed changes to EUcompetition law
calling for greater national jurisdiction and EU-Member State co-operation. As regards maritime
transport serviceswhere there are clearly non-competition issues at stake, theproblem is especially
noteworthy. The Commission has frequently claimed that the principal aim of the exemptions in
maritime transport services is to ensure an adequate and efficient supply (including chain of supply)
26 See para. 26 of the Decision, note 9 above.
27 Using theprocedure setout in Regulation17,OJ Sp.Ed.1962,No 204/62, p. 87.Note though that Regulation17 has nowbeen replaced
by Council Regulation1/2003 (16 December 2002) OJ L1/1 (4 January 2003).
28 The terminal operator or the stevedoring firm.
29 Comm Programme 99/027.
30 Whish,Competition Law (Butterworths, London, 2001), at125^128.
INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALORGANISATIONS :EUROPEANUNION :JIML 9 [2003] 3 295
ofmarine transportation services for EUexports and trade.However, given the importance of other
EU policy concerns, how should non-economic efficiency factors, such as issues on industrial rela-
tions, regional and international development, the environment, employment needs in the maritime
sector etc. be consideredwhen applying Article 81(3)?
Conclusion
It is clear that conferences are resigned to the fact that the sort of antitrust immunity they had en-
joyed until recently has largely been diluted. It may be deduced from the Commission's approach to
the newTACA that some antitrust immunity will be preserved for conferences but without their
biggest strategic advantage, price fixing, conferences need to redirect their resources to managing
supply (for example, taking some ships out of the trade) instead of setting rates and carriage
conditions.That shift is particularly difficult for liners because of five variables, most of which they
have little control over: the size of the world fleet, productivity, shipbuilding production, scrapping
and freight/liner rates.Despite these difficulties, conferencesremainupbeat, putting their faith in the
EU (and the United States) to ensure that they are at least protected from unfair competition from
foreign government-controlled vessels and restrictive foreign laws.
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